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The crisis of 2008 saw many European banks reduce their provision 
of trade finance in East Asia.  Notwithstanding the actions of the G20 
and other bodies to redress this, a substantial shortfall in trade 
finance facilities in the region remains. This article explores the 
development of this shortfall, and analyses potential responses to it. 
These responses range from some much-needed further revisions to 
the Basle III rules, to deepening of cross-border cooperation, 
creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance, encouraging 
co-financing among the various providers of trade finance both 
private and public, and establishing a regional trade finance 
database. In addition, the article ponders the likelihood of China’s 
banks beginning to take a substantial role in providing trade finance 
to the region. Trade finance offers China’s banks a low risk means of 
expanding into international business, and offers China a way to 
provide the sort of important service to its region that regional 
leaders typically seek to provide.  
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Trade finance is essential to support global trade, and the region that finances more trade 
transactions than any other is East Asia.1 Historically trade has been important in the 
evolution and development of civilisations.2 Today international trade enhances efficiency 
and competitiveness within economies and promotes their economic development.  
Some 80-90 per cent of trade transactions are supported by some form of credit financing, 
making trade finance an integral part of the world economy.3 Finance for international trade 
transactions is important for wealthy nations, and often critical for developing and emerging 
markets, where both exporters and importers may be severely constrained by limited working 
capital.    
The global financial crisis that commenced in 2007-2008 sparked a substantial worldwide 
shortfall in trade finance in a global market then estimated at $10-12 trillion a year.4 The 
effects of this contraction were markedly different in different regions.5 South Asia, Korea 
and China were particularly affected, with China experiencing a double-digit decline in the 
                                                            
1 Thierry Senechal (ed), Rethinking Trade & Finance 2013 (International Chamber of Commerce, June 2013), 
13. 
2 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the rise of Islam to 
1750 (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15-20; WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, ‘The role of trade in the 
rise of merchant cities’ (Speech delivered at a seminar on the role of cities in trade, Shanghai, 22 July 2010) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl163_e.htm>.  
3 Marc Auboin, ‘Restoring Trade Finance During a Period if Financial Crisis: Stock-taking of Recent Initiative’ 
(Working Paper ERSD-2009-16, World Trade Organisation, December 2009), 1. 
4 Marc Auboin, ‘Boosting the availability of trade finance in the current crisis: Background analysis for a 
substantial G20 package’, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight No. 35, June 2009, 3; Marc 
Auboin and Martina Engemann, ‘Trade finance in periods of crisis: what have we learned in recent years?’ 
(Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-01, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, 
January 2013), 14. 
5 Elizabeth Ho, ‘The International Effects of the Credit Crisis’ (2008) 28 Review of Banking and Financial Law 
102. 
 3
availability of trade finance during 2008.6 The G20 responded with its “trade finance package” 
in April 2009. In the words of the communiqué:  
“we will take, at the same time, whatever steps we can to facilitate trade and 
investment, and, we will ensure availability of at least $250 billion over the next two 
years to support trade finance through our export credit and investment agencies and 
through the MDBs (multilateral development banks). We ask our regulators to make 
use of available flexibility in capital requirements for trade finance.”7 
The package provided a much-needed boost, and financial agencies worldwide responded to 
the package by making substantially more finance available for trade.  
Export credit agencies (ECAs) increased credit insurance and risk mitigation capacity by 
creating programs for short-term lending of working capital and credit guarantees aimed 
primarily at small and medium enterprises (SMEs).8 Within our region, the leaders of eleven 
Asian ECAs formed the Asian Regional Cooperation Group (RCG) of the Berne Union, to 
meet annually to discuss responses to the global financial crisis.9 The group responded to the 
crisis with new initiatives to help sustain the trade and investment flow in the region and 
worldwide.10 In 2008, members of the RCG supported more than US$268 billion worth of 
international trade and investment.11 Since this time, the RCG has met three times a year to 
exchange information and views and consider solutions for the unique challenges faced by 
                                                            
6 Wei Liu and Yann Duval, ‘Trade finance in times of crisis and beyond’ (April 2009) 3 Asia-Pacific Research 
and Training Network Alerts 1. 
7 The G20 London Summit Leaders’ Statement, 2 April 2009, paragraph 22. 
8 Marc Auboin and Martina Engemann, above n 4, 17. 
9 Berne Union, Asian ECAs Joint Statement (13 August 2009) ≤http://www.berneunion.org/asian-ecas-joint-
statement/>. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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ECAs in East Asia.12 Such challenges include the rise of trade protectionism in some 
countries, stricter foreign exchange restrictions, frequent cases of false trade documents, 
substantial fluctuations in the economy and local conflicts.13 
Regional development banks (RDBs) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
responded by significantly increasing the capacity of trade facilitation programs.14 The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) increased the capacity of their program to US$1 billion, from 
US$400 million.15 The IFC also established a liquidity pool allowing co-financing operations 
with banks in developing countries, contributing $5 billion to jump-start the fund.16 This 
amount was matched by $7.5 billion in commercial bank funding,17 which has helped to 
support nearly $20 billion of trade transactions since its creation.18  
Central Banks in nations with substantial foreign exchange reserves responded by making 
portions of those reserves available to finance trade.19 Within East Asia, Korea pledged $10 
billion of its foreign exchange reserve to supply foreign currency to local banks and importers 
through repurchase agreements.20 Indonesia acted similarly.21 The central bank in Japan 
                                                            
12 Berne Union, Berne Union Yearbook 2013 (2013) <http://www.berneunion.org/news-
publications/publications/>. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Marc Auboin and Martina Engemann, above n 4, 17. 
15 World Trade Organization, The challenges of trade financing (May 2012) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/challenges_e.htm>; UNCTAD, Trade financing and regional 
financial institutions from a South-South perspective, (15 August 2012) 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciimem2d11_en.pdf>. 
16 Marc Auboin and Martina Engemann, above n 4, 17. 
17 Ibid. 
18 International Finance Corporation, Global Trade Liquidity Program 
<http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Industry_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/Industries/Finan
cial+Markets/Trade+and+Supply+Chain/GTLP/>. 
19 Marc Auboin and Martina Engemann, above n 4, 17. 
20 World Trade Organization, above n 15 and Marc Auboin, above n 4, 5-6. 
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opened temporary “discount windows” for local traders wanting to discount foreign trade 
receivables and other bills.22 On a much smaller scale, Thailand injected US$140 million baht 
into the Thai EXIM Bank to increase export insurance and allocated a further US$85 million 
to the Small Business Credit Guarantee Corporation so it could increase credit guarantee 
funds and loans to SMEs.23 
The G20 package ended in 2011. Trade finance availability and market conditions had 
improved continuously over the two-year period up to this time, with falling prices and 
increasing volumes of transactions, albeit with some volatility around an upward trend.24 
However, recovery has not been even across all countries and gaps in trade finance persist.  
In 2010 the G20 Leaders in Seoul commissioned a report by the WTO on existing trade 
finance gaps and the effectiveness of programs aimed at addressing them.25 The report was 
presented at the G20 Summit in Cannes in November 2011 and recommended that the MDBs 
and the World Bank Group expand the risk limits of their trade finance facilitation programs 
to allow for greater support to countries where local financial institutions cannot adequately 
support trade.26 The Asian region was identified as a priority area.27  
Europe’s withdrawal of trade finance to Asia 
Efforts to address the Asian trade finance gap have been hampered by the ongoing economic 
crisis in Europe. European banks traditionally provided substantial trade finance facilities in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
21 Ibid. 
22 Marc Auboin, ‘Use of Currencies in International Trade: Any Changes in the Picture?’ (Staff working paper 
ERSD-2012-10, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, May 2012), 13. 
23 Wei Liu and Yann Duval, above n 6, 3. 
24 Marc Auboin and Martina Engemann, above n 4, 17. 
25 Marc Auboin and Martina Engemann, above n 4, 21. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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East Asia and have severely limited their extensions of credit so as to improve their capital 
ratios.28 Since 2008, the proportion of international credit provided by Eurozone and Swiss 
banks to emerging Asia-Pacific economies has fallen from 38 per cent to 19 per cent of the 
region’s trade credit.29 Eurozone banks (excluding German banks) reduced their share of 
large-ticket Asian trade finance from 43 per cent to just 3 per cent in the 18 months leading 
up to the first quarter of 2012.30 French and Italian banks reportedly reduced their exposure to 
ASEAN countries by 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively in this period.31 The second 
half of 2011 saw a particularly rapid retreat, with European banks deleveraging their 
exposures to Asia by 18 per cent, a reduction of $89 billion.32 This retreat has led to a 
dramatic increase in trade finance prices in Asian markets.33 According to Barclays, “when 
European banks started to deleverage due to the Euro crisis [in 2011], trade finance pricing in 
Asian countries including India and China moved from 100 basis points to 200 basis points in 
three weeks.”34 
The reduction in trade finance by European banks has left a funding gap at a time of 
increasing demand for finance in Asia. In 2011, a $1 billion trade contract between the US 
                                                            
28 Aki Ito and Shamim Adam, ‘European Retreat Squeezes Asia Trade Finance as ADB Sees Loan Demand 
Climb’, Bloomberg (online), 6 December 2011 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-05/credit-squeeze-
hits-asia-trade-finance-as-adb-loan-demand-soars.html>. 
29 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Highlights of the BIS international statistics’ (December 2012) BIS 
Quarterly Review 17-18. 
30 Morgan Stanley, EU bank deleveraging and Asian trade finance (1 May 2012) 
<http://pg.jrj.com.cn/acc/Res/CN_RES/INVEST/2012/6/1/8fa9fcad-09b7-4dc6-a05a-dcb2d692b442.pdf>. 
31 Takehiko Nakao, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Japan, ‘International Regulatory Reform 
and New Financial Infrastructure in Asia’ (Speech delivered at the Asian Financial Forum, Hong Kong, 14 
January 2013)  <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/others/20130114.htm>. .  
32 Morgan Stanley, above n 30.  
33 Michael Bainbridge, ‘Basel III threat to Asian trade finance’, Financial News (online), 29 October 2012 
<http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-10-29/basel3-threat-to-asian-trade-finance>. 
34 Ibid, citing Kay Chye Tan of Barclays. 
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and China could not proceed due to the lack of trade finance.35 Recent data shows that 
Chinese exports grew by 25 per cent in the year to January 2013 and imports climbed by 28.8 
per cent in the same period.36 In 2012, demand for trade finance products increased 
significantly.37  
Fortunately, Japanese banks and some international banks such as HSBC and Standard 
Chartered have stepped in to cover much of the trade finance gap left by the European banks. 
In the past two years Japanese banks have dramatically increased their share of large-ticket, 
regional trade finance volumes, growing from 6 per cent in 2010 to an extraordinary 54 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2012.38 As a result, Japan became the largest provider of trade 
finance globally in 2012, with reported trade finance volumes of $16.8 billion.39 The 
Australian and New Zealand Bank (ANZ) has also capitalised on the European retreat, 
reporting a 29 per cent increase in trade finance revenue in 2011, and 58 per cent growth in 
Asia.40  
Most trade is financed in US dollars, and the retreat of the European banks has been in part 
                                                            
35 UNCTAD, above n 15. 
36 Sarah Turner and V. Phani Kumar, ‘China data helps lift most Asia stocks; Japan down’, MarketWatch, Wall 
Street Journal (online), 8 February 2013 <http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-02-
08/markets/36970890_1_quarterly-net-loss-sony-corp-china-data>. 
37 World Trade Organisation, WTO Report on G-20 Trade Measures: Mid-May to Mid-October 2012 (31 
October 2012), <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/igo_31oct12_e.htm>. 
38 Morgan Stanley, above n 30. 
39 ‘Japan tops trade finance charts’, Global Trade Review (online), 25 January 2013 
<http://www.gtreview.com/trade-finance/global-trade-review-news/2013/January/Japan-tops-trade-finance-
charts_10637.shtml>. 
40 Steve Slater, ‘Europe’s banks leave room for rivals to fund world trade’, Reuters (online), 16 April 2012, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/banks-trade-idUSL5E8E1B1P20120416>; Aki Ito and Shamim 
Adam, above n 28.  
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due to the rising cost of borrowing US dollars since the start of the Eurozone crisis.41 
Japanese banks, ANZ, HSBC and Standard Chartered have thus been in a position to benefit 
from the European retreat given their easy access to US dollars.42  
Despite Japanese and other banks stepping in, there remains a shortfall of finance for trade in 
East Asia today. A survey conducted by the ADB in March 2013 identified a trade finance 
gap of $465 billion in developing Asia.43 This finding is serious given the critical role finance 
plays in facilitating trade. The shortfall particularly affects our region as a higher proportion 
of trade is financed in East Asia than other regions. Notably, the majority of trade letters of 
credit issued globally are issued in Asia.44  
As well as a simple shortfall of finance, Asian companies have complained that the cost of 
trade finance is rising, possibly due to the growing pricing power of the few banks in the 
region willing to extend trade credit.45 While the top 40 institutions represented 95 per cent of 
the Asian trade finance market in 2011, only 20 remained in the market for Asian trade 
finance in 2012.46 
Basel III  
Apart from the retreat of European banks, the largest challenge on the horizon lies in the 
implementation of Basel III. While Basel III aims to establish a level playing field across 
                                                            
41 Francesco Guerrera, ‘French Banks Say Adieu to Financing Asian Trade’, Wall Street Journal (online), 3 
September 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443571904577629250952177234.html>. 
42 Morgan Stanley, above n 30. 
43 Steven Beck et al., Asian Development Bank Trade Finance Survey: Major Findings (Asian Development 
Bank, March 2013), 1. 
44 Michael Bainbridge, above n 33. 
45 Francesco Guerrera, above n 34. 
46 Morgan Stanley, above n 30. 
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borders, its implementation will not have the same impact worldwide. In the words of 
Takehiko Nakao, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs in Japan: 
“[The] international standards of financial regulation [comprising Basel III] are based 
on the experiences of the financial crises in the US and Europe, and do not necessarily 
reflect the conditions of the financial sectors in Asian emerging countries.”47  
The implementation of Basel III, in requiring larger capital holdings against trade 
transactions, could slow trade financing in emerging and developing economies in the Asian 
region by substantially raising transaction costs and discouraging trade financing, thereby 
exacerbating the already precarious position of many nations in the region.48 According to 
recent findings by the ADB, 79 per cent of banks surveyed stated that the Basel regulatory 
requirements had played a significant role in limiting trade finance.49 75 per cent of the banks 
surveyed indicated that they would reduce trade finance support by 5 per cent or more if 
Basel III were fully implemented.50 Furthermore, 65 per cent of respondents to the ICC 
Global Trade and Finance Survey 2013 said that implementation of Basel III regulations is 
affecting the cost of funds and liquidity for trade finance to some, or a large, extent.51 
                                                            
47 Takehiko Nakao, above n 31.  
48 Elliot calls it a ‘dangerous misconception’ that raising capital requirements will ensure a safer banking 
requirement and believes considerably more debate is needed. See Douglas J. Elliot, Higher Bank Capital 
Requirements Would come at a Price (20 February 2013) The Brooking Institute 
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/20-bank-capital-requirements-elliott>; Shawn Baldwin, 
Basel Barriers: How capital requirements would impede progress in the sovereign debt crisis (15 October 2012) 
Forbes <http://www.forbes.com/sites/shawnbaldwin/2012/10/15/basel-barriers/>.  
49 Steven Beck et al., above n 43, 4. 
50 Steven Beck et al., above n 43, 5. 
51 Thierry Senechal (ed), above n 1, 13. 
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Most experts expected that Basel III would considerably increase trade finance pricing 
worldwide if implemented in its original form.52 In January 2013, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision bowed to longstanding pressure from the banking industry to modify 
the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) for trade finance products. 53 The Basel Committee also 
delayed full implementation of the LCR requirements until 2019.54 
The liquidity rule requires banks to hold enough liquid assets to be able to withstand a 30 day 
liquidity crisis. The original rule was drafted narrowly and limited what banks could count as 
liquid assets to money and government bonds. The Basel Committee has now extended the 
rule to include less traditional assets such as residential mortgage-backed securities to satisfy 
up to 15 per cent of the LCR.55 Additionally, banks are now only required to hold 30 per cent 
of the funds they would theoretically lose access to in a crisis – a significant decrease from 
the 100 per cent originally required.56 While the original rule assumed that banks would lose 
5 per cent of their retail deposits during a theoretical 30-day crisis, the modified LCR 
assumes a loss of 3 per cent.57 Furthermore, banks will now only have to be partly in 
compliance by 1 January 2015, the date upon which the original rule was supposed to be 
implemented.58 The modified LCR will now be gradually phased-in over the further four 
years leading to 2019.59  
                                                            
52 Viren Vaghela, ‘Basel III threatens to throttle trade finance’, Asia Risk (online), 9 July 2012 
<http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/feature/2190078/basel-iii-threatens-throttle-trade-finance> and Michael 
Bainbridge, above n 33. 
53 David Enrich, Geoffrey T. Smith and Andrew Morse, ‘Rules for lenders relaxed’, Wall Street Journal (online), 
7 January 2013 <http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2013-01-07/rules-for-lenders-relaxed>.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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The decision to relax the LCR in January 2013 has generally been regarded by the industry as 
positive. However, some banks have criticised part of the amendment, which states that the 
LCR requirement should be based on collateral calls caused by market valuation changes, 
calculated by the highest collateral outflow during the preceding 24 months.60 Critics argue 
that the amendment could significantly increase the volatility of bank liquidity requirements, 
and force banks to hold much higher levels of liquidity to ensure compliance.61 This could 
affect banks’ capacity to provide trade finance. Even if the amendment to the LCR eases 
pressure on trade finance, the longer-term impact of Basel III as a whole is still likely to 
increase the cost of financing trade.62 
Potential Responses to These Challenges 
Further adjustments to the Basel III rules 
Trade finance rates of default and loss have historically been very low, even during crises. In 
2009, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and ADB initiated a trade finance 
default register to collect performance data on trade finance products.63 The register collects 
data from 21 global banks that provide more than $2 trillion in short-term export-related 
credit, roughly 65 per cent of the world’s total.64 The data collected by the project supports 
the claim that trade finance is much less risky than other parts of banking. Between 2008 and 
                                                            
60 Michael Watt, ‘Banks round on LCR approach to derivatives collateral flows’, Risk Magazine (online), 27 
June 2013 < http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2277631/banks-round-on-lcr-approach-to-derivatives-
collateral-flows>. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Thierry Senechal (ed), Global Risks – Trade Finance 2013 (International Chamber of Commerce, 24 June 
2013), 59. 
63 Thierry Senechal (ed), Global Risks – Trade Finance 2011 (International Chamber of Commerce, 26 October 
2011), 16.  
64 Brooke Masters, ‘Push to cut trade finance from Basel III’, Financial Times (online), 16 April 2013 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5b8b9f1c-a678-11e2-885b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XU9DFw8g>. 
 12
2011 the ICC Trade Finance Register recorded fewer than 1800 defaults in a dataset of 8.1 
million short-term trade finance transactions.65 During the same period the rates of default for 
off-balance sheet trade products were particularly low, with only 947 defaults recorded in a 
sample of 5.2 million transactions.66 The data collected determined the probability of loss as 
just 0.02 per cent.67 Fewer than 500 losses were recorded out of more than 7.5 million 
transactions between 2008 and 2010.68  
The proposed Basel III rules do not come close to reflecting this very low level of risk 
involved with trade finance. At present, there is no differentiation between trade finance and 
other forms of finance in credit conversion factors (CCFs) for calculating the leverage ratio.69 
Under the current rules, banks are required to apply a CCF of 100 per cent for all off-balance 
sheet items when calculating a leverage ratio.70 This applies to all trade finance claims, unless 
the claim is unconditionally cancellable without prior notice to the beneficiary, in which case 
a CCF of 10 per cent is applied.71  
Trade credit traditionally attracted a low risk weighting of 20 per cent under the first iteration 
of the Basel Accord because of these historically low default rates and because trade finance 
facilities are typically secured against the goods or commodities being financed. Under a 
                                                            
65 Thierry Senechal (ed), above n 62, 15. 
66 Viren Vaghela, above n 52. 
67 Thierry Senechal (ed), above n 62, 15.  
68 Thierry Senechal (ed), above n 63, 16. 
69 Garima Chitkara and Aaron Woolner, ‘Revised LCR falls short on ending Basel III concerns over trade 
finance’, Asia Risk (online), 6 February 2013 <http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/news/2242693/revised-lcr-falls-
short-on-ending-basel-iii-concerns-over-trade-finance>.  
70 Laurence Neville, ‘Euromoney Trade Finance survey 2012: Trade not getting the credit’, Euromoney (online), 
January 2012 <http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2959489/Euromoney-Trade-Finance-survey-2012-Trade-
not-getting-the-credit.html?Type=Article&ArticleID=2959489>.  
71 Garima Chitkara and Aaron Woolner, above n 69. 
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typical trade finance facility, the bank extending the credit has the bills of lading or other title 
documents to the goods or commodities pledged to it, and only releases this pledge when it is 
either paid, or another security interest is put in place.72 Accordingly, if the bank is not paid it 
should be able to recover much of the credit it has extended by selling the goods or 
commodities.  
The CCF of 20 per cent in the first Basel Accord remained largely unchanged under Basel 
II.73 However, on 10 January 2010 the Basel Committee proposed the introduction of a flat 
100 per cent CCF to certain off-balance sheet items in an attempt to reduce incentives for 
“leveraging”.74 This proposal included letters of credit and similar trade finance facilities.75 
Subjecting trade finance to a CCF of 100 per cent is utterly excessive given that the objective 
of the leverage ratio is to prevent the build-up of excessive leverage in the banking sector and 
yet, as trade finance underpins the movement of goods and commodities, it does not lead to 
the sort of leveraging that may endanger real economic activity.76  
Data collected by the ICC and ADB supports the view that the leverage ratio in its current 
form does not reflect market realities and may significantly limit banks’ ability to provide 
affordable financing to businesses in developing countries and SMEs in developed 
countries.77 As indicated by the ICC in its report Global Risks – Trade Finance 2011, the 
leverage ratio proposed by Basel III could have adverse effects on global trade and growth by: 
                                                            
72 Carole Murray; David Holloway; Daren Timson Hunt and Clive Schmitthoff (1903-1990), Schmitthoff: The 
Law and Practice of International Trade (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), 249-251. 
73 Marc Auboin, The prudential treatment of trade finance under Basel III: For a fair treatment (7 March 2010) 
Vox <http://www.voxeu.org/article/fair-treatment-trade-finance-under-basel-iii>. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 BAFT-IFSA, Trade finance – key concerns and recommendations for the Basel framework (1 December 2011) 
<http://www.esf.be/new/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/BAFT-IFSA-Basel-Talking-Points-2011-12-01-Final.pdf>. 
77 Thierry Senechal (ed), above n 63, 4. 
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“a)  curtailing banks’ ability to provide affordable financing to businesses in 
developing and low-income countries and to SMEs in developed countries; 
 b) increasing the cost of trade, with banks raising their prices to pay the costs 
associated with the more stringent regulatory requirements; 
c)   encouraging banks to move high-quality trade assets and contingents into non-
bank sectors and higher-risk, unregulated markets such as hedge funds, thereby 
defeating the purpose of strengthening the resilience of the banking sector; and 
 d)   redefining the banking map because inconsistencies in the implementation of the 
regulatory regime at the national level can create competitive arbitrage 
opportunities in some financial markets and can have an impact on the domiciling 
of banks.”78 
At present, Basel III also uses a standard asset value correlation (AVC) for corporate banking, 
imposing a treatment for trade finance that does not reflect its short-term, low risk nature.79 
The current rule requires the AVC to be multiplied by 1.25 in respect of exposures to 
financial institutions whose assets exceed 100 billion US dollars and to exposures to all 
unregulated financial institutions, regardless of size.80 The increase in AVC applies to all 
sources of credit risk exposure.81 The rule is based on the assumption that such exposures 
                                                            
78 Thierry Senechal (ed), above n 63, 7-8. 
79 Ibid; BAFT-IFSA, above n 76. 
80 Citibank, Basel III – Sailing the trade winds of change (October 2012) 
<http://www.transactionservices.citigroup.com/transactionservices/home/sa/b1/sibos_2012/docs/1015942_Impa
ct_of_Basel_III.pdf>; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), ‘Implementing Basel III capital 
reforms in Australia – counterparty credit risk and other measures’ (Discussion Paper, APRA, August 2012) 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/PrudentialFramework/Documents/APRA_Discussionpaper_BASEL3_CCR_FINA
L_2.pdf>. 
81 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), above n 80. 
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present greater default correlations than others.82 This assumption ignores the indisputable  
fact that trade finance rates of default are substantially lower than rates of default in other 
banking sectors.  
While Basel III subjects corporate banking to a blanket AVC, consumer banking is granted 
several product specific default curves.83 Under Basel III, separate AVCs are applied to retail 
mortgages, credit cards and other retail exposures.84 Like retail banking, corporate banking 
products should be distinguished from one another to accurately reflect their level of risk. 
Applying a standard AVC is likely to increase the cost of providing trade finance, and may 
prompt smaller banks to pursue other, more profitable areas of banking.85 In the words of the 
international banking industry association BAFT-IFSA: 
“The AVC proposals recommended by the Basel Committee could increase the cost 
of providing credit for trade transactions and limit their availability, particularly in 
emerging markets that rely on sustained and affordable access to trade finance to 
support commercial activities.”86 
Recent changes to the LCR under Basel III came about after sustained pressure from the trade 
finance industry.87 At present, making further changes to the rules will be difficult for the 
Basel Committee given public sentiment towards banks.88 While trade finance is crucial for 
world trade, it is currently seen as a minor issue in comparison to the ongoing Eurozone crisis 
                                                            
82 Garima Chitkara and Aaron Woolner, above n 69. 
83 Ibid. 
84 BAFT-IFSA, Key concerns regarding trade finance and transaction banking (2012) <https://www.baft-
ifsa.com/eWeb/docs/Misc%20Documents/JointIndustryLetterTalkingPoints.pdf>. 
85 Citibank, above n 80. 
86 BAFT-IFSA, above n 84.  
87 David Enrich, Geoffrey T. Smith and Andrew Morse, above n 53. 
88 Laurence Neville, above n 70. 
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and other problems in the banking sector.89 Furthermore, the Basel Committee is faced with 
the challenge that if they make concessions for one type of financing, others might make such 
claims as well.90 This would put a great deal of strain on the whole regulatory system and 
potentially undermine its objectives.91  
Given that statistical information demonstrates that trade finance is less risky than other 
forms of finance, there is a strong case for the industry to continue lobbying the Basel 
Committee to modify the Basel III rules. Without changes to the leverage ratio and AVC, it is 
highly likely that the price of trade finance will increase, with damaging consequences for 
global trade and thus global growth. 
A Crisis Contains Within t an Opportunity – for China  
The idea that the Chinese character for crisis contains within it the character for opportunity 
is such an elegant idea that it is often used by authors.92  Sadly it is not the case93 – but it is 
such a nice, elegant idea it should be.    
Nonetheless, matters of calligraphy aside, this crisis of inadequate trade finance in the East 
Asian region would seem to present an opportunity for Chinese banks which I am somewhat 
surprised they have not seized. At the Loan Market Association’s syndicated loan 
conference in London in 2012, there was a general consensus among panel members that 
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Chinese banks were preparing themselves to fill the void left by the French banks in the 
commodity finance market.94 According to Simon Tyler, head of corporate banking for China 
Construction Bank, London: 
“Banks such as Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank 
of China, and China’s Bank of Communications are already in talks about their moves 
over to London and are very keen on developing relationships with the top players. 
Although it will be a while before this presence is fully realised, partly because they 
are being very cautious. But slowly and surely as this happens we’ll see them 
competing with each other as much as with international banks.”95 
One reason for Chinese banks to be cautious is the rapid growth of credit in China, which has 
been growing at 22% a year.96 In 2012, credit in China grew more than twice as fast as 
GDP.97 The Chinese government is now taking measures to tighten liquidity levels and limit 
risky lending, in what some analysts say could be Beijing's most drastic clampdown on credit 
in two decades.98 In late June 2013, China’s central bank temporarily stopped lending money 
in an attempt to reduce the reliance of banks on credit.99 China’s other banks are now 
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following the government’s orders by reducing lending, impacting the availability of finance 
for certain commodities such as gold, rubber and base metals.100 In May, two banks stopped 
issuing letters of credit with long maturity dates to jewelers importing gold into the mainland 
for export processing.101 
In addition to the Chinese government’s crackdown on lending, other challenges exist that 
may delay China’s entry into the trade finance space. One example is the difficulty faced in 
opening branches in London and wider Europe due to licensing requirements..102 It may also 
take time for China to establish the requisite ‘back office’ needed to compete consistently in 
the trade finance industry.103 Trade finance document checking is very technical and requires 
very substantial and detailed training of staff, which will take some considerable time.104  
While China has not yet stepped into the trade finance gap left by the Europeans, it seems  
likely to do so in the next few years. Though rigorous training willbe required, China has 
proven itself very adroit at acquiring expertise in a wide range of technical and scientific 
fields, and the trade finance industry should be no exception. In addition, providing trade 
finance would seem to be a clever move for a government wanting to cut back on risky 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
2013 <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21580144-not-countrys-lehman-moment-it-does-herald-change-
momentum-bear-china?frsc=dg%7ca>. 
100 Fayen Wong and Polly Yam, ‘China banks curb loans to commodities firms in hot-money battle’, Reuters 
(online), 22 May 2013 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/china-commodity-credit-
idUSL3N0DY0IZ20130605>. 
101 Ibid. 
102 ‘Asian banks stand by to fill the commodity finance gap’, above n 94. 
103 ‘China banks behind on commodities’, Global Trade Review (online), 23 May 2013 
<http://www.gtreview.com/trade-finance/global-trade-review-news/2013/May/China-banks-behind-on-
commodities_10920.shtml>. 
104 R.P. Buckley, ‘The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits’ (1995) 28 
George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 265. 
 19
lending, given the exceptionally low rate of default on trade credits.105 In 2012, 73% of all 
export transactions took place in the Asia-Pacific, and the region  received the most letters of 
credit.106 There is an opportunity for China to make a considerable impact should it choose to 
step into the trade finance industry. 
Deepening cross-border cooperation 
Deepening regional cooperation on trade finance would be beneficial to all parties.107 By 
pooling resources and expertise, our region would be better equipped to tackle bottlenecks in 
trade financing.108 The cost of providing trade finance would also likely decrease.109 
Cooperation within the region would reduce reliance on foreign finance, which tends to be 
heavily procyclical and often destabilising.110 This is particularly significant given the current 
trade finance gap caused by the retreat of European banks from Asia.  
In the past, several developing countries with well-developed trade finance institutions have 
tackled South-South trade finance bottlenecks by opening branches of their institutions in 
other countries within the region.111 An example is the Thai Export-Import Bank, which 
opened a branch in Moscow in 2009 to facilitate the financing of Thai exports to the Russian 
market.112  
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In March 2012 the Export-Import banks of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) signed two agreements to extend credit facilities to each other in local 
currencies.113 It is expected that the move will reduce the demand for fully convertible 
currencies for transactions among the BRICS, which should help to reduce transaction 
costs.114 The initiative will also assist to shield the BRICS from the Eurozone crisis and boost 
trade despite the slow growth of developed country markets.115 
Strengthening the regional network of export-import banks and development finance 
institutions within Asia would assist our region to achieve the aims of the BRICS agreement. 
As the Eurozone crisis continues, European banks may well continue to withdraw credit from 
our region. Deepening cross-border cooperation within Asia will reduce the cost of trade 
finance within the region, tackle current trade finance bottlenecks and help to insulate Asian 
economies from the crisis in Europe. 
Despite the benefits that could be derived from regional cooperation, previous initiatives to 
improve financial cooperation within Asia have not always received support. In 2010, an East 
Asia Summit (EAS) Trade Finance workshop was held in Sydney and brought together trade 
finance officials from 13 nations to exchange views on trade finance proposals that could 
advance regional trade.116 Though financial cooperation was given special attention at the 
workshop, Australia’s idea of establishing an EAS Trade Finance Network was not supported 
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by other members.117 Nonetheless, the creation of a trade finance network within Asia is 
something that regional countries should continue to pursue. Its potential benefits to the 
region, given the ongoing demand for trade credit in the region, mean it would be very 
worthwhile.  
Creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance 
Since the global financial crisis, banks have become more risk averse and prefer to work with 
large, sound multinational firms.118 Consequently, SMEs and new exporters have been 
especially vulnerable to the tightening trade finance conditions.119 SMEs typically have a 
weaker capital base and bargaining power in relation to global buyers and banks, and have 
been subjected to large increases in trade finance costs.120 This is especially true of emerging 
firms, that often face higher interest rates, higher fees on letters of credit and higher capital 
requirements than established firms.121 In addition, firms in developing countries with 
underdeveloped financial systems and weak contractual enforcement systems are particularly 
affected by a lack of affordable trade finance as they need it the most.122 The lack of available 
trade finance for SMEs in developing countries impacts economic growth and job creation 
there.123 
                                                            
117 Eko NM Saputro, ‘The East Asia Summit and regional financial cooperation’, East Asia Forum (online), 18 
August 2011 <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/18/the-east-asia-summit-and-regional-financial-
cooperation/>. 
118 Jean-Pierre Chauffour and Mariem Malouche, ‘Trade finance during the 2008-9 trade collapse: key 
takeaways’ (September 2011) 66 World Bank Economic Premise 5. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 UNCTAD, above n 15. 
122 Jean-Pierre Chauffour and Mariem Malouche, above n 118. 
123 Thierry Senechal (ed), above n 1, 11. 
 22
Establishing a small, targeted liquidity pool run by international financial institutions would 
be useful to assist smaller segments of the market that are more vulnerable to the contraction 
of trade credit supply.124 After the global financial crisis, much of the increased liquidity 
support provided by central banks was used to ease money market conditions and improve 
liquidity ratios.125 As a result, trade transactions did not benefit greatly from the liquidity 
support, despite having remained a safe haven during the banking crisis.126 Creating a ring-
fenced liquidity pool for trade finance would ensure that adequate funds remain available to 
assist trade by SMEs and new exporters, even during times of crises when banks may prefer 
to direct funds elsewhere. 
For banks, the downside to ring fencing is that liquidity is prevented from being used for 
other purposes at times when the other purposes might be more pressing.127 Large cross-
border banking groups benefit from the efficiency of holding liquidity centrally and directing 
it to locations where it is most needed.128 This process is more cost-effective than ring 
fencing liquidity.129 Nonetheless, any disadvantages of a ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade 
finance could well be outweighed by the benefit of ensuring that trade finance is still 
available for SMEs and new exporters when economic crises occur and trade finance 
conditions tighten. 
Encouraging co-finance between the various providers of trade finance, including public 
sector-backed institutions 
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The majority of trade finance is provided by the private sector. In 2009, private banks 
accounted for about 80 per cent of all trade finance lending operations.130 Such reliance on 
banks leaves trading firms vulnerable in times of crisis, as seen with the recent drop in trade 
credit within Asia. To reduce the impact of crises on trade finance flows, public sector actors, 
such as ECAs and RDBs, should share jointly some of the private sector risk.131 In the words 
of Pascal Lamy: 
“One clear lesson from the Asian financial crisis is that in periods prone to a lack of 
trust and transparency, and herd behaviour, all actors – including private banks… 
export credit agencies and regional development banks – should pool their resources, 
as far as practicable.”132 
An example of a successful private/public partnership was the introduction in 2009 of the 
Global Trade Liquidity Program by the IFC, which allowed for a 40-60 per cent co-lending 
agreement between the IFC and commercial banks.133 The program allowed banks to 
continue to support clients with trade finance, and gave the IFC the ability to channel 
liquidity and credit into markets to help revitalise trade flows by leveraging the banks’ vast 
networks across emerging markets globally.134 
Mobilising both private and public-sector institutions to form a partnership during times of 
crisis would ensure that institutions with excess capacities had an opportunity to meet the 
needs of those with insufficient funds.135 However, co-financing between the two sectors 
need not only occur in times of crisis. Longer-term public involvement would help to close 
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the structural market gaps in poor countries.136 Furthermore, ongoing risk sharing between 
the public and private sectors should reduce the impact of any future financial crisis on the 
availability of trade finance. 
Establishing a regional trade finance database to facilitate the collection and exchange of 
information 
Filling information gaps between public and private institutions is of great importance, 
particularly during times of economic crisis. While responding to the financial crisis that 
commenced in 2008, members of the Bankers’ Association for Trade and Finance (BAFT) 
complained that a series of measures announced by ECAs and RDBs were hard to track.137 
They also lacked access to critical information, such as who was providing what finance, and 
upon what criteria.138 Such information gaps affect the ability of both the public and private 
sectors to respond to trade finance challenges, particularly in developing countries.139 It is 
thus crucial that information is collected and shared among trade finance stakeholders within 
the region. 
The ICC Trade Register established by the ICC and ADB in 2009 was a significant step 
towards increasing trade finance information. So far the database has recorded over 15 
million transactions worldwide, reflecting 70 per cent of global transactions.140 It is currently 
the most comprehensive database available on trade and export finance.141 Nevertheless, the 
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register only records data provided from participating banks.142 While this includes 21 of the 
most active banks in worldwide trade finance,143 gaps in data remain. Within our region, 
much more information is needed as to how SMEs, in particular, finance their trade and the 
challenges they face.  
While the ICC Trade Register provides useful information regarding trade finance 
transactions, it is not released immediately. The ICC released the latest trade finance report 
on 24 June 2013, nearly two years after its prior report..144 This information is crucial for the 
development of policy regarding trade finance, but does not provide stakeholders with up-to-
date information about the type and amount of trade finance being provided at the present 
time. In times of crisis, such information is needed to allow trade finance institutions to 
respond rapidly.  
In order to address gaps in trade finance information, a regional database should be created 
that disseminates relevant information to both public and private institutions, such as the 
development of programs by ECAs. Such a database should include all trade finance 
stakeholders within the Asian region, not just commercial banks. It is important that the 
information gap between the public and private sectors is filled so that both sectors can 
respond quickly when shortfalls in trade finance arise. 
Conclusion 
Trade is essential to the health and growth of economies worldwide. The availability of trade 
finance is crucial as most trade transactions are supported by some form of credit 
financing.145 There is also a strong link between trade finance, economic growth, and job 
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creation, which is particularly important in our region. In a survey conducted by the ADB in 
the fourth quarter of 2012, 138 companies said that a 5 percent increase in trade finance 
support would result in a 2 percent increase in their business and a 2 percent increase in their 
staffing needs.146 The same companies said that a 10 percent increase in trade finance support 
would result in 5 percent more production and jobs.147 These statistics show how crucial trade 
finance is to East Asia. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 sparked a global shortfall in trade finance and while the 
G20 and financial agencies worldwide responded in a significant way, a substantial trade 
finance gap remains. A recent survey by the ADB shows that in 2011, banks responding to 
the ADB survey received trade finance requests of $4.6 trillion148and had to reject $1.6 
trillion of these requests.149 This figure indicates that a significant proportion of global trade 
is unable to be financed. Given global trade totalled $18 trillion in 2011, it is likely that the 
actual trade finance gap is very substantial indeed.150  
The shortfall has particularly affected our region, as a higher proportion of trade is financed 
in East Asia than any other region. The ADB survey suggests a trade finance gap of at least 
$425 billion in developing Asia,151 which has developed in part due to the rapid reduction in 
finance provided by European banks struggling with the ongoing economic crisis at home. 
While international and Japanese banks have stepped in, the amount of trade finance provided 
in Asia is still insufficient, and the cost has increased considerably. 
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The impending full implementation of Basel III poses a further challenge to trade finance in 
our region. While the relaxation of the LCR requirements in January 2013 eased the pressure 
on trade finance, it did not eradicate it. Further adjustments are required to ensure that the 
longer-term impact of Basel III does not increase the cost of financing trade. In particular, 
changes to the leverage ratio and AVC are necessary to prevent rising trade finance prices 
impacting on global growth. With respect, the proposal to increase the risk weighting on trade 
finance to 100% must have been the work of people without experience in these markets. No 
one who understands the finance of international trade could perceive it as a risky industry, or 
as a source of unwanted leverage in the system. 
A number of strategies could be implemented to address a lack of affordable trade finance in 
our region. These include strengthening cross-border cooperation, encouraging co-financing 
between the public and private sectors, establishing a regional trade finance database to share 
information and creating ring-fenced liquidity pools for trade finance. In times of crisis, it is 
essential that all stakeholders work together and share information and resources to address 
trade finance needs efficiently and effectively. 
It is a little curious that China has not yet seized the opportunity presented by Europe’s rapid 
retreat from trade finance in Asia to step into the gap. Given the low risk nature of trade 
finance, it would seem an attractive way for Chinese domestic banks to expand into 
conducting international business. Nevertheless, the substantial size of the current trade 
finance gap suggests there is still space for China to make a move. Trade finance offers China 
a very low risk field into which its banks could expand. Such a move would help to address 
the ongoing trade finance gap and support the further development of economies in the Asian 
region. 
